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Changing Views on Catholics and Politics

Historians and pundits have treated the political behavior of American Catholics with great relish. Textbooks and newspaper morgues are replete with colorful descriptions of urban party machines. From the chronicles of Tammany Hall to the malaprops of Mayor Daley, some have come to think of Catholics and politics through terms like ethnic coalitions, slating, spoils, and corruption.

Another term from these accounts stands out — deliverable. If the ward committeeman could not deliver the vote the parish priest could. Behind the instructions from the pulpit, in the jaundiced eyes of many, were the manipulations of Rome.

Such mind-pictures may have described some cities and some parishes in some time periods. Recent historians have suggested that the picture is badly over-drawn. Church leaders were often reluctant to speak or act politically for fear of arousing anti-Catholic hostility and suspicion. For theological reasons, some priests deliberately limited their efforts to the "spiritual" not the secular domain. And the Catholic laity were hardly sheep. In some ethnic groups, for example Italians, males retained anticlerical attitudes from the old country and would have treated clerical attempts to lead them politically with derision. Regardless of the inaccuracies of newspaper and historical accounts of the earlier years, such portraits certainly were far from the demographic realities of American Catholics by the eve of the election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy to the Presidency.

Today a quite different picture of the political behavior of Catholics is being drawn. Social theorists are beginning to see Catholic parishes and American Catholic bishops as a source of hope. In a society of rampant individualism — where what I want, what I feel, and what are my rights forms the basis for the common good; where, in the words of Robert Bellah, "the nature of success, the meaning of freedom, and the requirements of justice" are devoid of a transcendent referent outside oneself — in such a society social theorists look for institutions that can recapture a sense of community and commitment. Catholic parishes, as well as some Protestant congregations and Jewish synagogues, are thought to be such "communities of memory" that bond us to the values of the past and include the hopes of the future in the way we, not I, judge the present. The pastoral statements of American Bishops on peace and the economy are seen as serious attempts to initiate dialogue along the moral dimensions of public policy.

Somewhere within but beyond the "private-regardingness" of the spoils politician, the "kept" flock of the parish priest, and the search for the common good and transcendent standards of the social theorist, there is an important contemporary story about Catholics and the American civic order. We hope to unravel at least a small part of it in this report. We begin with a short history of change in the civic participation of American Catholics and then interpret our questionnaire data on parish-connected Catholics to address three
questions: (1) do parish participation and civic participation overlap? (2) are the religious values of Catholic parishioners connected in any noticeable ways to their political values? and (3) do parishioners feel it appropriate for their church leaders to offer teachings on personal morality and social and political questions?

**Linking Parish Life, Political Values, and Civic Life**

**From Immigrant Communities to WW II**

In his path-breaking book *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (1977), Andrew Greeley argues that the dominant reality for American Catholics is the recency of the immigrant experience. Even in the decade after President Kennedy's election, 40% of adult American Catholics were either immigrants or children of immigrants.

Historian Jay Dolan in *The American Catholic Experience* (1985) tells us much about the immigrant church. It was ethnic. Ironically, although the Mass was celebrated in Latin, a universal language which some wag says was "read only by priests and understood only by God," nevertheless, the basis of the parish was the ethnic group, its native tongue, and its cultural traditions. A clarion call of the times was "he who loses his language loses his faith." A Polish parish church might be located less than fifty yards from an Irish parish church, but Mass should not be celebrated jointly. The arrangement of many parishes by ethnic enclaves both reflected and reinforced social and political differences among Catholic immigrant groups.

One thing these ethnic groups had in common was the search for opportunity, but they often found an inhospitable environment. They faced economic and social discrimination and sometimes religious persecution. Many, not far removed from the serfdom of eastern, central, and southern Europe, were now huddled in the squalor of industrial cities. They had little facility with the English language.

According to historians, the immigrant parish experience was custom-made for leaders who would act as brokers. Some parish communities had left the old country and arrived under the leadership of a priest; he was already a dominant force in their religious, social, and political lives. In other situations, people of common ethnic background would find each other, petition mission societies in the home country to send a priest, then organize a proto-parish awaiting his leadership. In some of these parishes, authority remained with the people through a trusteeship system, but that did not set well with the emerging American hierarchy who wanted parish authority lodged in the priest, as the local representative of the bishop.

Finally, there seemed to be a ready supply of Irish priests who were often assigned to parishes of other ethnicity. While people grumbled about the situation, they had to recognize that the Irish priest's facility with English helped in temporal affairs, and his
contact with Irish politicians would open opportunities for jobs, city services, and staying on the right side of the law.

Regardless of the ethnic parish's experience in acquiring priestly leadership, there were some pressures to look to the priest for political leadership. Whether he could offer it from the pulpit, in the newsletter, and in conversation at wakes, devotional societies, and fraternal halls depended in part on ethnic values brought from the old country, in part on the extent to which parishioners already had a sense of "ownership" over their parish, and in part on the hierarchy's sense that it was either "un-American" or theologically inappropriate to extend spiritual leadership to temporal matters.

The immigrant parish experience was also custom-made for acting in concert and instilling a sense of community interest. Seldom did community interest extend beyond opportunity for members of one's ethnic tribe, but at least it did offer a frame of reference for involvement in civic affairs that was beyond the individual. Some nowadays complain that the emphasis on social justice in the contemporary American Catholic church deviates from the church's historic focus on spiritual concerns. In reality, it perpetuates an ethnic parish tradition of social involvement, but in a different and broader context.

The parish benevolence societies and the ethnic betterment societies, always with the counsel of a priest, offered charity to those less fortunate in the parish; more important, these societies worked to improve economic and political opportunity and social acceptance for their kind of people in the larger community. The precursors of the social justice emphasis are not solely Dorothy Day or Daniel Berrigan, but the Italian American Relief Association or the Polish Roman Catholic Union, the German bunds or the Flemish kings. The difference is that those Catholics who now "have" are asked to advocate the same opportunities for "have-nots" outside the tribe. Whether this expansion of community-mindedness will succeed in the future may depend in part on the extent to which the stories of community concern from the past are retained and applied anew.

The immigrant community, then, provided three staples linking parish life and the civic order: (1) the sense of the underdog who hopes dearly to "make it" in the face of persecution, (2) community identity and action as avenues to betterment, and (3) where conditions permitted such clerical leadership, some deference to clergy not only on spiritual matters but also on temporal affairs.

**The GI Bill and JFK**

In the three decades following the Second War, however, a lot was changing in the life of Catholics that would change forever the mixture of these elements linking religion and politics. American Catholics became educated, mobile, pragmatic, and free. In retrospect, it appears that two watershed events shifted the relationship between parish life and civic life: the GI Bill and the election of President Kennedy. The American parish's later application of the goals and principles of the Second Vatican Council must be interpreted against the backdrop of these social and political changes.
The GI Bill and its permanent democratizing effect on educational opportunity enabled not only the earlier-assimilated, English-speaking Irish Catholics to pursue higher education, but for young people (then, mostly men) of all Catholic ethnic backgrounds to pursue higher education. Greeley documents the time-point when each ethnic group overtook the educational achievement norm for the rest of American society. Nowadays, people in most Catholic ethnic groups have educations that nearly match those of Jews. Their education rivals those of "silk-stocking" mainline Protestants such as Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Congregationalists (UCC), and considerably exceeds Methodists, Lutherans, Baptists, and Pentecostals.

Just as important as the level of attainment is the location of study. Increasingly the bachelor's degree was completed at national rather than local Catholic institutions, at state universities, and at the elite private colleges. Loyalties were instilled toward a non-Catholic alma mater. Now it is commonplace to find Catholics establishing endowed chairs in Catholic studies at, for example, Florida or Cornell, rather than for programs at Benedictine or St. Joseph's, Notre Dame or Georgetown.

Just as the War had taken them to Dunkirk or Guadalcanal, so the GI Bill and its aftermath moved them from the old neighborhood to the suburb. Fewer returned to the ancestral parishes and the neighborhood communities with ties that bind and priests who direct. More Catholics settled in subdivisions that came to be served by very new, very active suburban churches. Much as they shopped for suburban housing and commuted long distances to work in jobs of their choosing, a growing number shopped for a church that "met their current needs," and sometimes passed by the local parish church on their commute to the Catholic church of their choice. In time, a decline in vocations to the priesthood and to women's religious orders meant that the many parish programs and ministries that "served their needs" would have to be led by the laity themselves. Lay persons not only shouldered responsibility for parish ministry, but became increasingly involved in parish administration and governance. Canon law changed, partly in recognition that the church is "the people of God," but also in recognition that parishes are better served by consultative and enabling leadership than by authoritarian direction. We are now on the threshold of the third generation of post-GI Bill families — a laity educated, mobile, pragmatic, and free.

The nature of the temporal authority of the clergy was also greatly affected by the election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Lacking authentic American Catholic heroes, the upwardly-mobile GI-Bill generation and their children were captivated by this young prince. What he did on the road to the presidency was not only to embrace the religious pluralism of America, but to proclaim the political liberty of any Catholic. Kennedy's dramatic address to the Houston Ministerial Alliance during the 1960 campaign was based on the American experience; the roots of his argument tapped not the syllabus of errors, the First Vatican Council, or the papal denunciation of Americanism in 1899, but the Catholic Maryland colony's declaration of religious liberty and John Courtney Murray's writings which put Murray on the Index. (Historian Martin Marty, political scientist Mary
Hanna, and Mr. Kennedy's wife have all observed that Kennedy himself was not steeped in Catholic intellectual traditions and was perhaps not so sensitive as others to church-state issues. Thus, to rely on the American experience came quite naturally for him.) A few years later, the Second Vatican Council embraced similar positions in its teaching on religious freedom and ecumenism. These themes, which have come to be normative not only for the American church but for the worldwide church, were advocated at the Council sessions especially by the American cardinals, Spellman and Dearden.

For many Catholics in that day, this Catholic in the White House symbolized the inappropriateness of religious bases for political judgments. For Catholic Republicans (of whom their were many among Italians, Germans, and earlier-assimilated generations), subtle appeals to cross over and vote for a fellow Catholic were taken as an insult to their political freedom. In our day, the notion that a priest or a bishop with less education than many parishioners and certainly less schooling in the ways of economic and political institutions should attempt to instruct parishioners in how to vote is usually regarded with annoyance or amusement. For some in the present generation, even reminders of the social teachings of the church through bishops' pastoral letters have become a call to action — in opposition. Thus, the recent pastoral on the American economy was met with a counterpastoral, even before its adoption. The connections between parish life and civic life have become increasingly nuanced.

Today American Catholics are in the cultural mainstream of the nation. The nature of the Catholic community and its institutions have changed—some say for the better, some say for the worse. For example, George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli in their recent book The American Catholic People: Beliefs, Practices, and Values (1987) note, but do not bemoan, the Americanization of Catholics. Instead, they celebrate the Catholicization of America. Gallup and Castelli suggest that Catholic experience and action have made unique and positive contributions to American cultural norms and political discourse regarding: (1) tolerance, (2) women's rights, (3) the communal dimension of society, (4) presidential politics, and (5) peace. That is why social theorists are again paying attention to American Catholics. Relationships between church life and civic life that were relatively stable in the immigrant church appear to have changed. Social theorists anticipate that there will be significant changes in civic values, as well.

Religion in Social Theory

Social theorists have long argued that religion is the glue that holds the social, economic, and political orders together. To know what a people values religiously is to know what they expect of their political order. And to observe how they interact in their religious institutions is to presage how they will behave in the civic order.

In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that religion in America was a "doers" matter. How one lived his life in the community was the test of whether a person was a Christian and could be trusted in matters political and economic. In contrast to Europe where religion was sacramentally-based and offered an other-worldly salvation to the
Catholic, Anglican, or Lutheran communities, in the United States, religion was individualistic and worn in public; it called for "decisions for Christ" and testimony within this world. It created a tradition of political discourse laced with morality and organized as a crusade, a tradition that carries to our day: abolition, civil war, manifest destiny, temperance, women's suffrage, white man's burden, make the world safe for democracy, civil rights and racial integration, war on poverty, evil empire, and so on.

In the early 1900s, sociologists of religion, Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, referred to this phenomenon as "sect-type" religiosity rather than "church-type" religiosity. In church-type religiosity, one is born into the religious community and attains salvation through the church's sacramental acts; in large part, the religious community and all God-ordained social institutions are prior to the individual. In sect-type religiosity, however, it is the individual who comes to embrace Christ, who understands God's will through personal study of the Scriptures, who communicates directly with God in prayer, and who shows the indwelling of God through public conduct. The individual chooses which church he will join, just as he gives or withholds support for public institutions based on his perception of how they conform to God's laws. Weber and Troeltsch's sect-type religious culture described well Tocqueville's "doers'" religion and helps to explain the extraordinary mingling of religion and politics in America. It also helps to explain the moral crusades of American politics, as well as the volatility of support for political leaders and the skepticism about governmental institutions. In the American way, no institution has prior claim to legitimacy; it must prove itself in the court of individual choice.

Tocqueville paid special attention to Catholics in America, who in the 1830s were not a large segment of the population. He noted that American Catholics seemed more communal and less individualistic in orientation. He traced that to a church-type religious culture in the mother countries. Yet the host culture of America was sect-type and individualistic. Tocqueville was uncertain whether Catholics would transform the culture or the culture would transform Catholics. Some charge that the massive entry of Catholics into the American mainstream has been accompanied with the embrace of individualism. We will explore that contention shortly through our data.

Another theme of Tocqueville appears in more recent social theory: the best protection against the tyranny of the state is a civil society organized into many institutions which compete with each other, while reflecting transcendent values. The specter of totalitarianism, whether in fascist or communist form, has caused many social theorists to fear both liberal individualism and the homogenization of mass society. Peter Berger, Michael Novak, and Richard Neuhaus, among others, have looked to mediating institutions as forces that protect the individual from an all-powerful state, that become centers for identity rivaling the attraction of the nation-state, that provide services so that the individual does not become totally dependent on the state, and that offer moral criteria for judging the performance of the state. Religious communities are thought to be particularly well suited as mediating institutions.
Kenneth Wald, developing this argument from the perspective of a political scientist, argues that church members derive four essential political skills from their parish or congregational involvements: (1) they acquire social skills in listening, mediating, and leading, (2) they learn about public issues from a religious perspective, (3) they receive encouragement to join in civic and community activities, and (4) they come to see a sacred character in those social obligations that transcend selfish interests.

The link any given individual may make between religious beliefs, political values, and civic participation may take a variety of forms. Parish members are already "joiners," and numerous sociological studies have documented that church "joiners" are more likely than nonjoiners to belong to other voluntary associations. The transference of political skills from the church setting to other civic and public settings is also reasonably well documented, although it varies in strength.

What is a matter of much more dispute among sociologists and psychologists of religion is the manner in which specific religious beliefs get translated into public policy positions. Studies by Charles Glock and Rodney Stark and by others have indicated that orthodox and, to some extent, fundamentalist beliefs about God and the Scriptures are associated with the support of conservative, status quo-oriented, and anti-civil libertarian public policies. Milton Rokeach offered a similar finding for those who value salvation more highly than a variety of other goals in life. Yet, Dean Hoge and others have shown that the saliency of religion in one's life predicts well to attitudes on family and sexuality issues but not very well to other major public policy matters.

Leege, Welch, and Trozzolo have shown that, among Catholics who marry a Catholic spouse, there is greater consistency with church teachings on family and sexuality but less consistency with church statements on justice, peace, the economy, and equal opportunity, than is found among Catholics with a non-Catholic spouse. The lesson from such studies is that the linkage between religion and political questions depends both on what is taken as evidence of religiosity and what is the specific public policy.

In studies that move beyond the level of the individual to the activities of the parish or congregation, there are many ways the religious institution may manifest its presence in the community. A recent work by David Roozen and his collaborators has suggested four ways that the local religious institution may choose to organize its people toward the outside community: (1) in an activist orientation, where it takes corporate social, economic, or political action to overcome an injustice in the community; (2) in a civic orientation, where it informs individual members about social problems and encourages their participation, but as individuals, not as members of the parish, (3) in a sanctuary (i.e., withdrawal) orientation, where members can retreat from the ills of the world and join in common rituals and readings, in anticipation of the afterlife; and (4) in an evangelistic orientation, where members are expected to witness their hopes of salvation in an evil world and thus to transform the hearts of fallen people. Just as we can expect Catholics, the products of church-type religiosity in a sect-type religious culture, to embrace a wide variety of political views, so we can expect that their parishes may take any one of these
stances toward civil society, depending on their locale, their traditions, and their local leadership.

**Scope and Data of this Report**

This report will examine many of these concerns about the linkage among parish life, political values, and civic life. The data are examined in three parts. We will first see to what extent there is an overlap between parish participation and civic participation, whether the same kinds of people participate in each, and whether specialization in some field of parish activity is accompanied by involvements in similar civic organizations. Secondly, we will summarize a program of research undertaken by Leege and Welch to examine what political values active Catholic parishioners have, to see what kinds of religious values best predict political orientations, and to assess whether social characteristics or religious values offer stronger explanations for Catholic parishioners' political views. Thirdly, we will explore what Catholic parishioners feel are the appropriate political roles of their priestly leadership, and the areas where it is acceptable for the hierarchy to offer social teachings.

Throughout the report, our primary data base is the 2667 parish-connected Catholics who responded to our questionnaire. We remind readers to exercise caution in generalizing from our findings. We should expect differences between our findings and general population surveys of Catholics of the kind done by the Gallup organization, the National Opinion Research Center, or the Institute for Social Research. Our data include Catholics with parish connections, who were carried on the rolls of the 36 non-Hispanic parishes selected through a mixed probability design as representative of American parishes, and who were sufficiently interested to respond to a long questionnaire. Earlier reports and methodological papers have identified the strengths and biases of such a sample.

A major methodological problem of any work of this kind is caused by the great geographic and parish mobility of American Catholics. In assessing the Berger and Wald arguments about mediating institutions and political skills, for example, we would like to know whether parish life has contributed to a given civic orientation or political outlook. Yet we have data only on the parishioners' current parish involvements, as well as data on the parish religious culture; the formative elements in a person's civic orientation, however, may well have been the nature of parish life in a previous parish. Thus, some of the most interesting parts of the argument cannot be addressed through our data. We will have to confine our quantitative arguments to parish involvements in general rather than to parish involvements in a specific context.

**Parish Participation and Civic Participation**
Early in the questionnaire, we asked respondents to list all the parish activities, programs, or ministries in which they had participated during the last year, to estimate the number of hours per month spent in each, and to indicate what kind of leadership position, if any, they held. Later in the questionnaire we asked a similar question about their participation, hours, and leadership in various civic organizations outside the parish community, ranging through fraternal or sorority, service, veterans, political, labor, recreational, youth, school service, hobby or social, nationality, farm, literary, professional, or neighborhood, as well as similar extra-parish church-related organizations. Table 1 shows the proportion of the respondents participating in parish and in extra-parish or civic activities.
Table 1
Comparison of Parish Participation with Civic Participation, 2667 Parishioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic or Extra-Parish Participation</th>
<th>Parish Participation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One Activity</td>
<td>Two Activities</td>
<td>Three or More</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Organization</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Organizations</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or More</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>99.8%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Error due to rounding.

The table offers several lessons. The percent of respondents who participate in no civic or extra-parish organizations is slightly higher (56.7%) than those who participate in no parish activities besides Mass and devotional rituals (50.9%). However, only a little over one-third (34.9%) participate in neither. That is to be expected, given the nature of our parish-connected respondents. They are "joiners" by definition.

Of greater interest is the question of whether parish joiners are civic joiners, and vice versa. If one adds along the first row (10.8 + 6.4 + 4.6), it can be seen that 21.8% of the respondents engage in one or more parish activities but no civic activities, while if one adds the first column (7.8 + 3.9 + 4.3), it can be seen that 16.0% of the respondents engage in no parish activities, but do participate in one or more civic organizations. Finally, if one adds all the remaining cells together, it can be seen that 27.1% of the parish-connected Catholic respondents are at least minimally active in both parish and community, i.e., they participate in one or more activity of each.

In sum, among Catholics who appear on parish membership lists and respond to surveys of this kind, nearly two-thirds are "active" in either their faith community or their civic community, and over one-fourth of them (27.1%) are active in both. Further, when specialization occurs, a higher proportion of parishioners limit their participation to parish affairs (21.8%) than to civic affairs (16.0%).

Joiners and Leadership
If joining is a reasonable indicator, there is active participation in both the church and civic sectors by a sizable proportion of the parishioners. Thus, it can be argued that the Catholic parishioners in this sample show at least the first condition for linking parish life and civic life: they join both. At the same time, over fifty percent (56.7%) “belong” to nothing outside their parish and over one-third (34.9%) engage in neither non-liturgical activities within the parish nor civic activities. Whether the joiners are linking parish activity to civic activity, we cannot say. At least some overlap exists.

To measure the overlap more precisely we decided to see whether the specific kinds of things one does in the parish are paralleled by the specific kinds of things one does in the civic community. To examine this issue we have classified parish involvements into the following categories: (1) governance (e.g., parish council, finance committee), (2) liturgical leadership (e.g., rector, Eucharistic minister, cantor, musician), (3) education or evangelism (e.g., religious education teacher, discussion group leader, RCIA sponsor), (4) devotional or renewal (e.g., prayer group, RENEW team), (5) social or recreational (e.g., church dinners, social clubs, athletic teams), and (6) welfare or social justice (e.g., visits to sick, soup kitchen, social issues). Then we used correlation measures between participation in such parish activities and in the civic organizations enumerated earlier.

Parishioners who participate in governance, liturgical leadership, or education or evangelism activities are the ones most likely to engage in many kinds of extraparish civic activities. That is no surprise. All involve leadership — i.e., sufficient education, self-confidence in front of groups, and a track-record of responsible action. The latter two can be learned either in parish settings or civic settings, and all three are valued both by church and civic organizations. Those in parish governance are more likely to be involved in civic service organizations, in political organizations, and in extraparish programs aimed at religious study and leadership development. Those involved in parish liturgical leadership roles are also quite likely to join civic service organizations and social or hobby groups. Those involved in parish education and evangelism tend to be highly specialized, with extraparish involvements in school service activities and youth groups. Those involved in devotional and renewal activities are likely to have an extraparish frame of reference but it is with church service, political, and discussion groups rather than non-church civic organizations. Finally, those involved in parish-based welfare and social justice activities are the most specialized of all in their civic activities, devoting a great deal of effort to political organizations.

Given the degree of civic specialization in some of these categories of parish activists, it is worth examining whether parish joiners and civic joiners seem to be responding to the same stimuli. For this purpose we have used two statistical techniques — multiple regression analysis and logistic regression. We have looked at the degree of parish involvement, the degree of civic involvement, and the overlap between the two, as a function of such social characteristics as age, stage in the family life-cycle, education, income, ethnicity, urban-rural locale, and region; such political characteristics as party preference and liberalism-conservatism; and such religious “intensity” measures as frequency of Mass attendance, frequency of Bible reading, and proportion of education
completed in Catholic schools. The resulting tables are too technical for a report of this kind, but they can be made available to scholars interested in them. Here we will summarize the key findings.

**Gender, Culture, and Education**

The greatest differences between parish participation and civic participation among Catholic parishioners involve gender: the parish is mainly the domain of women and civic life is mainly the domain of men. To be sure, many men and women are found in both parish activities and civic organizations, but where there is specialization it most clearly relates to gender.

Many social theorists would interpret gender differences by the church's function as the extension of home and hearth, and by the roles of women as nurturers and preservers of values. Men, by contrast, are seen as the traditional material providers; the civic involvements of men are seen as extensions of their economic interests. If these notions are accurate, however, there is a paradox with Catholic women and men.

While it is true that many of the parish involvements of Catholic women involve nurture and value-conservation (e.g., religious education) and extensions of the hearth (e.g., dinners, bake sales, altar care), nevertheless, earlier reports have shown that women are now as deeply involved as men in parish governance and liturgical leadership roles. Furthermore, to focus on the parish-hearth activities of Catholic women and to suggest that these involve few civic skills is to overlook the large numbers of Catholic men engaged in parish fraternal and recreational activities which, for many, involve little exercise of civic skills. Finally, women who have organized a parish bake sale or tried to move things along in the parish kitchen know the complex range of political skills that must be exercised in that process. Thus, for women, not only social participation but leadership skills are honed in the parish.

The paradox comes with the transference of those skills to extra-parish civic organizations. Outside the parish it is the Catholic men who are more likely to participate and lead. Yet, the women also have the skills. It is not that Catholic women lack economic interests. Examination of recent national surveys shows a slightly higher proportion of two-earner families among Catholics than among Protestants. Catholic women have been employed outside the home for years. We hypothesize, however, that their jobs lack the status and the earning power of their husbands' jobs, and that their jobs are less likely to involve them in the web of community organizations. We also suspect, but cannot document from available data, that Catholic women have retained primary, if not sole, responsibility for the hearth, and have less disposable time for civic affairs.

Although family and economic realities change, cultural patterns that reinforce role specialization linger longer. Suzanne Marilley has argued that the Protestant women long active in the reform movements of this country — abolition, child labor, temperance, suffrage, etc. — often had supportive husbands or were the daughters of clergymen who
encouraged their daughters to "transform the world in the name of God." Marilley notes that Catholic women were disproportionately absent from such movements, they obviously did not have clergy fathers, and they had to fight male definitions of their roles as confined to the hearth. (It should also be remembered that during the great reform years of 1840 to 1920, most Catholics were living in immigrant ghettos, were not yet awakened to "national" issues, and were often unwelcome if they did care about these issues.) Under the circumstances, some historians have argued the best opportunities to join in social reform and exercise "civic" leadership were through women's orders; thus, a religious sister might become a hospital administrator or operate a settlement house.

If these arguments are correct they may shed light on the current paradox of Catholic women as leaders in the parish but as less involved than Catholic men in civic organizations. We would anticipate that the increasing parity of education between Catholic men and women, the massive entry of young Catholic women into business and professional occupations, the later age of marriage and smaller families, stronger expectations of household roles for men, along with the increasing incidence of divorce and its attendant economic pressures on those Catholic women who are less educated — all will contribute toward greater balance between the sexes in their parish involvements and civic involvements. For now, however, both lingering cultural norms and economic structures may inhibit the transference of civic skills from parish to civic organizations.

Putting gender differences aside, the best overall predictor of both parish participation and civic participation is education. Education is a much stronger predictor of civic involvement than of parish involvement, but in both, the higher the education, the more one will participate. Education raises sights and raises the sense of responsibility. Education develops skills and the most important attribute of leadership — self-confidence. The interplay of all these traits is seen in the data. In the civic arena, education is a slightly better predictor of the participation of Catholic women; in the parish, education is a slightly better predictor of the participation of Catholic men.

_Bible Reading and Devotions_

Another vitally important predictor of parish involvement is one of the religious intensity measures — frequency of Bible reading. Although Bible reading does not rival education as a predictor of both parish and civic involvements, it far exceeds education in its effects on parish involvement. And it is far more important in understanding women's parish participation than men's.

We think there is a renewed gift of the Spirit operating in Catholic circles nowadays. Vatican II encouraged greater devotion to the Holy Scriptures, and much ceremony attends the public reading of the lessons from The Book. Furthermore, the first two lessons are typically read by the _laity_, not the clergy. But Vatican II also encouraged growth in the _individual's_ understanding of the Christian faith. Compared with historians' estimates of the past, there appears to be an increase in private devotions involving Bible
reading. Our data show that while one-third of the sample never read the Bible privately, nearly one-fourth are fairly regular readers (several times a month up to daily).

We have much data on Catholic devotional practices. The fascinating conclusion is that no other private or public devotional practice does a better job of predicting parish involvement than does the frequency of Bible reading. Recall earlier in our discussion of sect-type religious culture, that social theorists drew a link between Biblical devotional styles, civic participation, and civic responsibility. We can certainly draw that link for parish participation among Catholics, and a bit later we will show some of its relationship to political values. We cannot say that Bible reading causes involvement; perhaps involvement causes Bible reading. What we can say is that the two are part of the same complex and that they have positive effects on each other. In a church defined as "the people of God," Bible reading and parish involvement are hard to separate.

This linkage can be seen especially when we examine our parish-connected samples regionally. According to most of the measures used in previous reports, Catholic parishes in the Northeast have been slower to adapt to the reforms advocated by Vatican II than parishes elsewhere in the country. It is precisely in the Northeast where frequent Bible reading is the strongest predictor of parish participation. Where other forms of encouragement for lay growth and responsibility are limited, it appears that Bible reading is extraordinarily strongly related to participation in parish programs and ministries. In theological terms, the power of both components of the equation — Word and Sacraments — can be seen.

Life Cycle and Social Status

Some other predictors are important either in parish life or civic life. Stage in the life cycle is not far behind education in predicting the parish participation of both men and women; as people get married, have children, and the children grow into their teens and leave the nest, parish participation increases. But civic participation is not geared so closely to stages in the life cycle.

Civic participation, however, is quite responsive to social status as measured by a family's income level. The higher the income the greater the participation. Income level is more important for women than for men, and it is somewhat important for women in their church participation as well. We suspect that these findings index the amount of available time that women have. Where family income is higher, often women have more discretionary time to devote to both civic life and church life. (The absence of discretionary time also helps to explain why Catholic women were sparse in the great reform movements of the 1840s to the 1920s.)

None of the other factors matter a great deal in predicting parish involvements or civic involvements.
Catholics' civic involvements are more responsive than parish involvements to the class basis of American society. Additional analyses must be completed before we can say whether civic skills learned in the more "class-blind" parish situation help to overcome the class basis of American civic life. At this point we know that some involvements and skills carry from church to society, but we also have good hints about the cultural and economic factors that limit the transfer of skills.

Social Backgrounds, Religious Values, and Political Values

Much has been written by social scientists contrasting the political values of different religious bodies. For the most part Catholics are more Democratic, more liberal on welfare issues, more tolerant on inter-group relations, and less hawkish on national defense than are members of other Christian bodies, but are less so than Jews or those with no religious identity. An increase in Republican identity and political conservatism of Catholics as a result of their enormous upward social mobility has not materialized to the degree most theorists would have expected, although there is some movement along both dimensions.

Not all Catholics agree, of course, in their political values. Our data are useful for clarifying two questions. First, are parish-connected Catholics different in political values from all self-identified Catholics in national polls? Second, what factors influence Catholics in forming their political values? We look at each in turn.

Party Affiliation and Issue Positions

Table 2 offers a comparison of the party identifications of Catholics in our parish sample and self-identified Catholics in general population surveys of the National Opinion Research Center. Because of the Notre Dame group's decision to limit this initial study to non-Hispanic surnamed parishioners, we have also excluded self-identified Hispanics from the NORC/GSS data reported in this table. (In its phrasing of the question, NORC does not separate "no preference" from "Independents.")
Table 2
Party Affiliation of Non-Hispanic Catholics, Comparison Between Parish-Connected Sample and General Population Samples*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Notre Dame's Parish Sample '83- '84</th>
<th>NORC'S Gen. Pop. Samples '82- '84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preference*</td>
<td>{12}</td>
<td>{35}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2667)</td>
<td>(1213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For purposes of comparison, Hispanic Catholics are excluded from this table.

**Not asked on NORC studies; appears only as a residual category.

The Notre Dame Study, a sample of "churched" Catholics who are slightly older, and the NORC/GSS studies, samples including both "churched" and "unchurched" Catholics who are slightly younger, look rather similar. Jim Castelli, comparing the Notre Dame data with Gallup data for the same period, finds that 50% of all self-identified Catholics call themselves Democrats, 19% Republicans, and 33% Independents. Thus, on the dimension of party identification, parish-connected Catholics are not notably different from self-identified Catholics.

Nor are there many major differences in their political viewpoints. Castelli has also compared the Notre Dame sample with the Gallup data along a variety of issues. The combination of churched and unchurched Catholics in the Gallup data are notably more likely to permit abortion in all or most circumstances than are the churched Catholics in the Notre Dame sample (22% to 6%). The majority of both (57% and 69%) express support for abortion only in "extreme circumstances" such as rape, incest, or threat to the life of the mother. Finally, 19% of the former and 26% of the latter express support for the official church position which bans all abortions. On the Equal Rights Amendment, Castelli finds that 69% of each sample expresses support.

Churched Catholics are more supportive than the combined population of churched and unchurched Catholics on two issues identified as part of the "seamless garment" of human life: a bilateral nuclear freeze and opposition to capital punishment. According to Castelli, 92% of the Notre Dame sample supports the bilateral freeze as opposed to 70 to 84% of the Catholics in Gallup's samples of the same period. Further,
about one-third of the Notre Dame sample opposes capital punishment but only one-sixth of Gallup's Catholics oppose it. Both are issue areas where the American bishops have offered public teaching and, as might be expected, the churched Catholics' position is closer to that of the teaching. Greeley has documented a remarkable movement in the polls toward the nuclear freeze position, once the bishops' statement worked its way into the public sphere. About three-quarters of both samples favor gun control through registration of firearms.

The responses of the Catholic parishioners in our Notre Dame Study to a variety of public issues are shown in Table 3. Generally only 3-5% of the respondents offered no opinion and are excluded from the table.

### Table 3
**Parishioners' Opinions on Selected Public Issues**
*(N = 2667)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Strongly Favor</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration of all firearms.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death penalty for persons convicted of murder.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring prayer in public schools.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring public schools to give equal time for the teaching of creation theory and evolution theory about man's origins.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowing homosexuals to teach in public schools.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busing to achieve racial integration in the public schools.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased spending for national defense</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycotting or not buying the products of those companies who sponsor television shows in which there is a morally objectionable content</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urging our own government to &quot;freeze&quot; the development of nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviet Union does.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urging both the United States and the Soviet Union to &quot;freeze&quot; the development of nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should let parents deduct some of the costs of sending their children to parochial schools.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Many political scientists have noted the difficulty of characterizing people as "liberal" or "conservative" by their issue positions. A person may be liberal on one matter but conservative on another matter which seems to the experts to be related to the first. And so it is with Catholic parishioners. Large majorities support gun control, ERA, and the bilateral nuclear freeze. But substantial majorities support the death penalty, boycotts of TV sponsors of morally objectionable shows, prayer in public schools, equal time for teaching of creationism; similarly, they oppose allowing homosexuals to teach in public schools, school busing for racial integration, and a unilateral nuclear freeze. There is overwhelming support for tuition tax credits and about a fifty-fifty split on defense spending.

One of the reasons for both the consistencies and inconsistencies is that people have little information about public issues and are simply responding to "catch-words." Thus, the raw figures presented in tables such as Table 3 have to be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, slogans are the stuff of the political agenda and few people understand in depth any public issue.

What factors help to explain differences in political orientations among Catholic parishioners? In dealing with this question it is appropriate to recall the findings of Greeley, Wald, and Castelli: on most public issues Catholics are slightly more liberal than others who have Christian church affiliations. But what seems to make some more liberal or more conservative? In a series of scholarly papers and journal articles, David Leege and Michael Welch have been untangling these questions. Their models are complex; specialists can assess their adequacy by referring to the list of works appended to this report. Here we will summarize their findings.

Social scientists have traced differences in political orientations to a variety of factors such as social class, degree of ethnic assimilation, degree of communalism (i.e., exclusive involvement with people of one's own kind), differences in political generations or age cohorts, differences in regional political cultures (e.g., tolerance of public corruption is different between Wisconsin and Louisiana, and attitudes toward governmental spending are different between Iowa and New Hampshire), and gender roles. Different groups have different histories along these dimensions. The same is thought to be true among Catholics. Therefore, Leege and Welch tested the impact of these factors on parishioners' party identification, political ideology, and issue positions. The models isolate the unique impact of each factor.

**Social Structure and Party Identification**

They found that differences in party identification among Catholic parishioners are primarily the result of ethnic assimilation, income, and political generation. Catholics from
the earlier, more assimilated, and higher income ethnic groups (such as English, Scandinavian, German, and Irish) are somewhat more likely to be Republican than Catholics in later, somewhat lower income, or less assimilated Catholic groups (such as Poles, Upper New England French, Hispanics, or Blacks). Furthermore, younger Catholics are far less likely to have a party affiliation at all than are older Catholics.

Leege and Welch contend that party affiliation is primarily responsive to social structural features and less responsive to religious beliefs and social values. But that creates conflict with the other political orientations of Catholics, because political ideology and issue positions are sometimes more sensitive to religious beliefs and social values than to social structure.

*Religious Individualism and Communitarianism*

One of the strongest predictors of Catholic parishioners' sense of whether they are political liberals or conservatives is our measure of religious individualism and communitarianism. This may come as a surprise to those who think political ideology is solely a function of one's income, social class, or party affiliation. In fact, it is a rather important finding of the entire Notre Dame Study and especially germane to the arguments of social theorists such as Tocqueville, Bellah, or Berger. *How* a person is religious does matter politically.

To capture the degree of religious individualism or communitarianism, we asked respondents to select from a list or write in their own words: (1) what the fundamental problem of human existence is, (2) how religion responds to that problem, and (3) what the outcome of that solution is. They then drew lines connecting the responses from each of these questions so that a problem-process-outcome sequence was mapped. Those for whom the sequence clearly used *me, my problems, my salvation* as the frame of reference were classified as religious individualists. Those for whom *relationships, intergroup conflict, and community concerns* were clearly the frame of reference were classified as religious communitarians. Those who mixed elements of both in their sequences were classified as integrated. Our current work with these measures classifies 38% of the parishioners as individualists, 29% as integrated, 18% as communitarian, and 15% as anomalous, not fitting any pattern.

The utility of this measure of "deep" personal religious orientation can be seen especially in the relationship to political ideology but also to some issue positions. The more a Catholic is religiously individualistic, the more he or she is likely to be a political conservative; the more a Catholic is religiously communitarian, the more he or she is likely to be a political liberal. There are also consistent patterns on women's rights, male-female family roles, the threat of secular humanism, and sexuality — with the religious individualists taking more conservative positions and the religious communitarians taking more liberal positions. Interestingly, the religious individualists are more likely than the communitarians to claim that their religious values will influence their voting behavior.
This measure of "deep" religious orientation does not predict other issue positions as well, however, as do some other factors in the backgrounds of Catholic parishioners.

**Income, Generations, and Region**

A Catholic's income level and social class are also strong predictors of political ideology and positions on defense and disarmament issues: the higher the income, the more conservative, the more supportive of defense spending, and the more opposed to disarmament.

To no one's surprise, there are very large conflicts among Catholic political generations or age cohorts. These show especially on perceptions of the threats of communism and secular humanism, changing family roles, sexuality, and women's rights and gay rights. The younger generations are more liberal; their elders, more conservative.

Regional differences, however, are the best predictors of all for Catholics' viewpoints on racial matters, law and order issues, school-related issues, and the defense/disarmament complex. While there are consistent issue differences by degree of assimilation and by gender, these are not so strong when the other factors are considered.

To summarize, then, social structure (especially ethnic assimilation, social class, and political generation) is important in understanding differences in the party identification of Catholics, but their political ideology and issue positions are responsive to a mixture of these factors as well as others.

**Imagery of God and Devotional Style**

Differences in Catholics' political orientations can be traced to several other "deeper" measures of how they are religious. Welch and Leege have formulated measures of imagery of God, devotional style, and closeness to God, in addition to religious individualism/communitarianism. The first two are especially useful. The former is a measure of what Catholics think about God while the latter is a measure of what Catholics do in their religious practices.

Imagery of God was developed by presenting the respondents with a list of twenty-seven adjectives or descriptive phrases and asking how accurately each characterizes their picture of God. A procedure called factor analysis identified which images are coherent with other images. Although seven sets of images were extracted, one in particular predicts political orientations well: images of God as judgelike. Those who think of God primarily as strict and judgmental, rather than in other ways, are considerably more likely to be self-classified as political conservatives and to take consistently conservative positions across the whole range of political and social issues. They also were more likely than others to feel that their religious values affected their voting behavior.
The next most important set of images pictured God as *remote* or indifferent to human needs. Such Catholics were slightly more likely to call themselves political liberals and to support busing, the unilateral freeze, ERA, nontraditional parenting roles, and slightly more permissive abortion policies. Those who viewed God as a close *companion* were far more likely than others to support school prayer and traditional parenting roles. Other sets of imagery about God, such as pictures emphasizing the maternal, nurturing side of God, or God as Redeemer, or God as Father, were not particularly distinctive in their political implications.

It appears as though those Catholics who picture God primarily as a judge would like to order the world in a predictable way through tradition and a strong, status quo-oriented government. On the other hand, those Catholics who view God as less directly concerned with the human condition are oriented toward social change, including both cultural practices and government-sponsored actions. In still another question, we asked respondents whether the best way to deal with injustice and social problems was to change the social and political structures or to change the hearts of people. Those who imagined God as a judge were far more likely to choose the latter, while those who thought of God as somewhat remote were more likely to choose the former.

Devotional style was constructed by factor analyzing a list of twenty-one items that indicated how frequently respondents participated in a wide variety of public devotional rituals and private devotional practices. This time, five coherent patterns emerged and one was especially useful in predicting differences in Catholics' political orientations. This factor we called *evangelical-style devotionalism*. It consists of frequent Bible reading alone or with friends, private prayer, and prayer in small groups of family and friends. It is much less likely to include more traditional devotional practices such as novenas, public rosary, benediction, stations of the cross, fasting, or confession.

Those Catholics who score high on evangelical-style devotionalism are much more likely to feel that their religious values affect their voting behavior. Their issue positions are an interesting composite. They are consistent on many of the "seamless garment" issues, opposing abortion and capital punishment and calling for reduced defense spending and the bilateral freeze. They support, as expected, school prayer. They oppose ERA and affirm the male breadwinner role, but are surprisingly less judgmental about premarital sexual behavior. Just as we noted earlier the linkage between Bible-reading devotionalism and parish participation, so we note the distinctiveness of this type in their political orientations. Ideologically they are neither predictably liberal nor conservative; in fact, on the self-classification measure, they do not choose one over the other. But the fact that this group consciously relates religious values to voting, even more so than those consistent political conservatives who view God as judgelike, suggests not only an important measure of religiosity but perhaps a new political sector among the Catholic population.

No other pattern of devotional style was found effective in predicting political orientations. The measures of closeness to God, captured horizontally through a social
connection or vertically through a spiritual connection, were interesting theoretically but did not differentiate political orientations well.

To summarize again, there are political differences among Catholics that are based not only on their social backgrounds but especially on how they conceive of their faith. Images of God, devotional styles, and foundational beliefs all have a differential impact on political values. And since these elements of both social background and religiosity vary among Catholics, there are major political differences. Religious differences survive in importance even when differences in social backgrounds have been considered. While there is one Catholic Faith, there are many religious and political manifestations of it in America. Then how can the pope, American bishops, and priests hope to offer social teachings that will apply the church's moral values to contemporary issues? To that matter we now turn.

Should Church Leaders Speak Out on Issues?

When contrasted with countries like, for example, Poland or the Philippines, American Catholics become quite edgy about "directions" from bishops or priests on "political" matters. Perhaps it betrays their long period as an underdog, when others regarded Catholic clergy as "un-American" if they made pronouncements on social issues or encouraged support for a candidate. Perhaps it reflects a pervasive American cultural value of skepticism or even distrust toward anyone in authority. Americans give and withdraw popular consent quickly from our Administrations — witness the roller-coasters of the Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan presidencies. Perhaps it results from the self-confidence of an educated, economically achieving, politically secure Catholic population. Whatever its source, polls continually document that American Catholics hold the "political" pronouncements of their leaders at arms' length. Reporting on the Gallup data, Castelli notes that 55% of Catholics reject the proposition that bishops should speak out on "political issues like the war and the economy."

Yet when the question is phrased in such a way that the word "political" is not so apparent, American Catholics are more likely to accept guidance from church leaders on "moral issues in the political realm." It is, after all, a church with a century of social encyclicals, a church with a social philosophy that finds virtue in public service, and a church with nearly two millennia of dealings with the state.

We phrased our question in such a way that it omitted the word "politics." It spoke not of hypotheticals, but of a reality, that church leaders "offer guidance and teaching on current matters in a number of different ways." We then listed several issue areas and asked the respondent to check "which level of authority, if any, ought to speak on that matter," or "whether this is a moral judgment that should be made only by the individual Catholic." Respondents were free to check several levels of church leadership (e.g., pope,
bishops, parish priests) as well as "individual conscience" simultaneously. As Table 4 indicates, some of them did so.

**Levels of Church Voice on Seven Issues**

Table 4 shows the proportion of respondents (1) who limited their checkmarks to some level(s) of the hierarchy (Column 1), (2) who checked some level(s) of the hierarchy but also checked individual moral judgment (Column 2), or (3) who felt it was a matter for individual conscience alone with no moral guidance from church leaders (Column 3). The final column shows which level of authority — pope, bishops, priests, individual Catholic — received the most mentions on each issue. The table presents the issues in order, from the most emphasis on church leaders to the most emphasis on individual judgment.

Some readers may be puzzled in contrasting our findings with those of earlier Gallup polls or some questions on the recent *National Catholic Reporter/Gallup poll* (NCR, September 11, 1987), where seemingly very little role was accorded church leaders. In part, that is because of sample differences: Gallup addresses self-identified Catholics, both churched and unchurched, while the Notre Dame Study focuses on active parishioners. More importantly, the differences result from question wording. In American culture, language that includes "politics" or asks "who should have the final say" — "church leaders" or "individuals" — and defines "individuals" to mean "persons taking church leaders into account and then deciding for themselves" will generate responses favorable to "individuals." Americans do not like to give up their ultimate ("final") moral autonomy, although they might allow church teachings some role. In contrast, our wording implies that since such teaching is offered, it may be appropriate for church leaders to do so. In Gallup's question wording, it is easy for the Catholic to choose the individual, while still respecting church teachings. In our wording, it would take a much stronger revulsion toward the role of church leaders as social teachers to select "individual moral judgment." Thus we might consider the NCR/Gallup findings as tracing the lower boundary on church leaders' moral authority, whereas our findings might set the upper boundary.

**Table 4**

**Church Voices on Public Issues:**

**Who Should Speak, in the Viewpoints of Parishioners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Some Levels of the Hierarchy Should Speak</th>
<th>Combination of Hierarchy Speaking and Individual Deciding</th>
<th>A Matter of Individual Conscience Alone</th>
<th>Primary Level of Church That Should Speak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid to poor countries</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Pope (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminating poverty from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data sustain a strong generalization with several ramifications: Catholic parishioners are generally not averse to the pope, bishops, or their priests' offering moral guidance on public issues. Nevertheless, on some issues fairly large proportions of parishioners feel that church leaders should not speak out. Parishioners are most willing to accord a role to church leaders on complex matters of world poverty and peace, and the spokesman is primarily the pope. When poverty in the U.S. is at issue, two-thirds of the parishioners view it as proper for bishops to speak out. When the issue gets closer to something the individual parishioner perceives is within grasp, he or she is more likely to label it a matter of individual conscience. Birth control is the most obvious of these; the church's leadership is accorded far less authority to guide its people here than on other issues. Women's rights, sex and violence on TV, and racial integration, in that order, are the issues on this list next most likely to be perceived as matters for individual conscience alone. Even then, parishioners grant that the more local leaders (e.g., priests or bishops) might have some moral authority on such issues.

Patterns of Differences in Parishioners' Views

Do parishioners take a consistent position about the moral authority of church leaders, or do they change their position depending on the issue? For example, would a person who rejects the authority of *Humanae Vitae* over birth control also reject papal teaching on disarmament? And would a person who accepts papal authority over birth control also accept church leaders' pronouncements on world hunger? We suspected that the coalitions change from issue to issue. Therefore, we first designed analyses (*cluster analysis*) that found whether any patterns from the issues in Table 4 showed coherence, making sense both statistically and substantively; then we used another kind of analysis (*discriminant function analysis*) that helped to identify what kinds of Catholics were found in each of the patterns. Cluster analysis is a complex trial-and-error procedure, but the best fit of data and substantive interpretability yielded four patterns. We employed twenty-two variables as predictors, including all of the social background political party and ideology, and religious practice variables used to explain political orientations in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>this country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bishops (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action for world disarmament</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Pope (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial integration</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Bishops (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Priests (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex and violence on TV</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Priests (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunities for advancement</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Individ (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regardless of workers' sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Priests (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bishops (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth control</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Individ (54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
previous section. To these we added the respondent's own issue position on the topic under consideration. The four patterns and the kinds of Catholics who fit each pattern are as follows:

1. **Church leaders may speak out on all the issues.** Of the parishioners, 36% approximate this pattern. Besides their general willingness to accept the church leaders' teaching on birth control, the most distinctive things about these parishioners is that they are older, less educated, and quite likely to be opposed to ERA. They tend to be moderately conservative politically, but their issue positions are not consistently conservative. They feel religious organizations should lobby on policy questions and that their religious values affect their voting behavior.

2. **Church leaders may speak on all issues except birth control, where the individual alone must make moral judgments.** This group includes 34% of the parishioners. It is composed especially of better educated, younger parishioners who are politically moderate to liberal, who support the freeze and ERA, oppose defense spending, are willing to accept busing for desegregation, who feel their religious values affect their voting behavior, and are willing to have church leaders lobby on issues. But they are both strongly opposed to the church leadership's position on birth control and feel that church leaders have no authority to offer it.

3. **Church leaders should not speak out on issues, although it is somewhat more legitimate to do so on international poverty issues than on other matters.** This pattern is approximated by 20% of the parishioners. These Catholics are conservative ideologically and consistently conservative on their issue positions, ranging from peace through social justice and racial discrimination, but curiously they support ERA. They do not feel their religious values affect their voting behavior, and they are opposed to church leaders' lobbying. They are slightly younger, are a bit better educated and better off financially, and are strongly opposed to the church leadership's position on birth control.

4. **Church leaders should speak out on matters of sexual morality, but the individual conscience is the sole basis for judgment on matters of justice and peace.** This small group, only 2% of the parishioners, is older, very conservative, likely to be men from less assimilated ethnic groups, and strongly opposed to church leaders' lobbying.
   (An additional 8% of the parishioners could not be classified into any of the four patterns that were reasonably well predicted by these political, social, and religious characteristics.)

   Surprisingly absent or infrequent from the characteristics that predict well these patterns toward church teaching authority are gender, political party identification, frequency and kinds of religious practices, and proportion of education that was completed in Catholic schools. More important are the amount of education, age cohort, political ideology, and specific issue positions.
These data suggest, then, that when church leaders exercise their teaching authority on political or social questions, they will often receive a polite reception from American Catholic parishioners. Nevertheless, the closer the teaching gets to personal morality, the less authority the people accord to it. The teaching will have to contend with the parishioners' existing political predispositions. Except for perhaps a quarter of the parishioners who routinely consider church teaching highly suspect, the pronouncements of church leaders may help shape the dialogue along with other political forces. Sometimes, it seems, church leaders will cross a threshold, where the statement is perceived as blatantly "political" or is thinly disguised so as to make only one choice possible. As the Gallup data attest, American Catholics do not take well to such efforts.

In the American context, the moral authority of the Catholic Church's leaders is held in delicate balance by parishioners who are educated, mobile, pragmatic, and free. There is some evidence that parish participation and civic responsibility reinforce each other among Catholics. There is further evidence of considerable variability in political views. These can be traced not alone to different social backgrounds but also to different ways of thinking about God, of ways in which they feel religion responds to fundamental human problems, and of their preferred patterns for communicating or learning about religious values.

If historical accounts are credible, major changes in the authority of the church over temporal affairs have occurred. To be sure, over two-thirds of the parishioners in our sample feel it is appropriate for religious organizations to try to influence legislation, and slightly under one-half of them feel that their voting is guided in large part by their religious values. Furthermore, parishioners often expect statements from church leaders as part of their moral calculus. But it is that-a calculus, a mix of elements. In the 1980s, "deliverable" would clearly be the wrong word to describe American Catholic parishioners, pulpits, and politics.

What American experience, the GI Bill and the election of JFK hath wrought, Vatican II cloth seek to sanctify. Therein lies an opportunity and a challenge for the Catholic Church in American culture.

PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS

Since the listing of papers and publications in Report 7, March 1986, several other papers have been completed, related publications have appeared, and other publications are scheduled for release soon. These include:

Papers

David C. Leege, "Moving Toward a Mental Measure of Religiosity:' September 1986.


Dissertation


Forthcoming Publications


Related Publications

"Liturgy in the Parish ' Pastoral Music, 10 (June-July 1986). Theme issue devoted to excerpts and discussion of the Parish Study.

"Music and Song:' Pastoral Music, 10 (August-September 1986).

Jim Castelli, "A Tale of Two Cultures ' Notre Dame Magazine 15 (Summer 1987), pp. 33-34.

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PREVIOUS REPORTS

Report #1
The U.S. Parish 20 Years After Vatican II:
An Introduction to the Study

Report #2
A Profile of American Catholic Parishes and Parishioners:
1820s to the 1980s

Report #3
Participation in Catholic Parish Life:
Religious Rites and Parish Activities in the 1980s

Report #4
Religious Values and Parish Participation:
The Paradox of Individual Needs in a Communitarian Church

Report #5
The Celebration of Liturgy in the Parishes

Report #6
Of Piety and Planning:
Liturgy, the Parishioners, and the Professionals
Report #7
The People, Their Pastors, and the Church:
Viewpoints on Church Policies and Positions

Report #8
Parish Organizations: People’s Needs,
Parish Services, and Leadership

Report #9
Parish Life Among the Leaders

Report #10
The Parish as Community